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STRUGGLES FOR MEANING AND STRUGGLES FOR CONTROL:  
THE DIFFUSION OF BANDWAGON TECHNOLOGY 
 IN TWO INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using comparative case studies, this paper shows how institutional contexts influence the 
process of diffusion of a complex technology by determining the pattern of material resources 
and authority available to actors in their struggles to control the technology, and by constitut-
ing the discursive resources that may be mobilized in their struggles to shape its meaning in 
preferred ways. The paper also reveals how governance structures may be contested and re-
aligned when they conflict with interests legitimized by dominant institutional logics. This 
form of contestation and adjustment constitutes one mechanism by which institutional frame-
works are tested, stretched and reproduced or redefined.  
                                                 
1 We thank Jean-Philippe Bonardi, Peer Fiss, Robin Gustafson, Mariann Jelinek, John Meyer, Tammar Zilber and partici-
pants in the 2008 Academy of Management symposium on the “Travel of Health Care Ideas: International Perspectives” as 
well as participants in the 2007 EGOS subtheme on Innovation and Institutions for their helpful comments on earlier ren-
derings of the data and ideas in this paper. The authors are also grateful to the “Fondation du 450e anniversaire” of the 
University of Lausanne, to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and to the Fonds québécois 
pour la recherche sur la société et la culture for their financial support of this research. 
4/47 
How does the nature of the institutional environment influence decisions about the adoption 
of advanced technology within an institutional field? Reciprocally, how might organizational 
decisions about technology contribute to the maintenance or adaptation of institutional 
frames? Although there is a vast literature on the diffusion of technological innovations (Fer-
lie, Fitzgerald, Wood, & Hawkins, 2005; Greenhalgh, Robert, Bate, Macfarlane, & Kyriaki-
dou, 2005; Rogers, 2003; Ryan and Gross, 1943), and although institutional theory has fre-
quently been mobilized to explain the diffusion of managerial innovations and ideas (Abra-
hamson, 1991; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983), there is surprisingly little work that has examined the specific role that institutionalized 
structures and meaning systems may play in the process of diffusion of technological artifacts, 
or on how these decisions might eventually challenge institutional frames.  
In this paper, we address these issues by examining the diffusion process for a complex medi-
cal technology – positron emission tomography, or the PET scanner – in two institutional con-
texts, one of which is more market-oriented (Switzerland) and the other more centrally ma-
naged by a public agency (Quebec). The comparison allows us to untangle the role of the in-
stitutional environment in the diffusion process by holding the object of diffusion constant. 
The PET scanner is a particularly interesting technology for this study because it is complex, 
extremely expensive, and was initially at least, quite controversial, creating excitement in the 
medical community while engaging health care regulators in efforts to control its diffusion.  
Indeed, while there has been concern that some health care innovations have been adopted too 
slowly (Ferlie et al., 2005), there is evidence that others have over-diffused, resulting in ex-
cessive health care costs (Foote, 1992). This phenomenon tends to occur for capital intensive 
technologies (e.g., CT scans, magnetic resonance imaging, PET scanner) that are attractive to 
health care providers because of their prestige and potential economic and/or clinical benefits. 
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The resulting so-called “medical arms race” is fuelled by a perception that early acquisition 
will provide competitive advantage by enhancing the reputation of the provider, as well as by 
capturing scarce resources such as patients, specialized doctors, and budgets to operate the 
technology. Moreover, to recoup the acquisition cost of capital intensive technologies, suppli-
er-induced demand may further enhance the overuse of the technology (Foote, 1992; James, 
Perry, Warner, Chapman, & Zaner, 1991).  
And yet health care systems are highly regulated and institutionalized. Regulatory agencies, 
insurers and professions can intervene in an attempt to influence, control or manage the diffu-
sion of costly innovations (Foote, 1992). More generally, the particular institutional arrange-
ments surrounding the health care systems of different countries or jurisdictions may structure 
adoption decisions in different ways through their influence on rules, on incentives, and on 
local values and norms (Alexander and D'Aunno, 2003; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 
2000). While previous economic studies have suggested that more competitive environments 
tend to speed up diffusion (Rapoport, 1978; Vogt, Bhattacharya, Kupor, Yoshikama, & Naka-
hara, 1995), there have been few comparative studies that have attempted to trace out in detail 
the processes of diffusion in different jurisdictions to examine how different contexts influ-
ence understandings of the technology and the patterns of adoption and diffusion over time. 
Clearly, the PET scanner has all the characteristics of what we call a “bandwagon technology” 
where the pressure to adopt is likely to be intense. It is thus likely to engage multiple actors 
within the organizational field, providing an ideal case to address our research questions. The 
research draws on institutional and socio-political theories of technology diffusion. Specifi-
cally, institutional arrangements in each jurisdiction are viewed as structuring patterns of 
power, interests and values that will influence technology adoption in interaction with the 
characteristics of the technology itself (Denis, Hébert, Langley, Lozeau, & Trottier, 2002).   
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We find that the processes of diffusion in both jurisdictions are characterized by struggles 
between providers and between providers and public authorities as providers push to acquire 
the technology faster than their rivals. These struggles manifest themselves in two distinct but 
interacting forms of action. First, they involve what we call struggles for control in which 
actors strategically mobilize power in the form of material resources and authority to orient 
adoption decisions according to their particular interests. At the same time, they also involve 
what we call struggles for meaning in which actors engage in competing arguments or theori-
zations concerning what the technology is, how and why it should be used and who might 
legitimately acquire it. We show that the institutional environment influences these processes 
by determining the patterns of material resources and authority available to actors in their 
struggles for control, and by constituting the discursive resources or institutional logics on 
which actors may legitimately draw in their struggles for meaning. We further show how in-
stitutional governance structures may be contested and realigned when they conflict with in-
terests that are legitimized by dominant institutional logics. We suggest that this form of con-
testation and adjustment constitutes one mechanism by which institutional frameworks are 
tested, stretched and reproduced or redefined. 
With its emphasis on contextualized meaning systems, their mobilization for political 
ends, and their contribution to the work of institutional reproduction (Zilber, 2008), this paper 
recognizes the importance of values, meaning and culture in institutional processes. At the 
same time, it illustrates the reciprocal role of institutionalized governance structures in consti-
tuting the political context within which meanings are mobilized (Scott, 2008).  
We now present the theoretical background for the study, and then describe the case 
study methodology used. This is followed by a chronological presentation of the two cases, 
drawing particular attention to the struggles inherent in the diffusion process and to the insti-
tutional logics mobilized by actors as they interpret the role of the technology, as well as to 
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how actors challenge existing institutions. The comparative analysis of the two cases leads to 
a series of propositions for further research as well as some discussion of the implications of 
this study for the understanding of institutions. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
We now draw together three key conceptual elements that form the backdrop for our 
analysis. First, we present our view of innovation adoption as a socio-political process em-
bedded in an institutional context. Second, we elaborate on the key components of institution-
al environments that are likely to shape patterns of diffusion. Third, we focus on the notion of 
“theorization” as a vector of diffusion, and explain how this concept is applied in this study. 
Innovation Adoption as a Socio-Political Process Embedded in an Institutional Context 
To simplify somewhat, two diametrically opposing views characterize thinking about 
the organizational adoption of innovations (Walston, Kimberly, & Burns, 2001). Rational-
economic models assume that innovators make rational decisions based on calculations of the 
risks and benefits of adoption (Rogers, 2003). In contrast, neo-institutional views explain dif-
fusion as the result of coercive, mimetic and normative forces in the institutional environment 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). From this perspective, by bowing to coercive pressures, imitat-
ing other organizations, or by following professional norms, adopters are viewed as seeking 
legitimacy – possibly even to the detriment of organizational efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). Various studies have examined the extent to which rational and institutional models of 
diffusion offer adequate explanations for diffusion, and have suggested that while early adop-
ters are motivated by economic or resource dependence considerations, institutional forces are 
more influential for later adopters (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Walston et al., 2001). 
This dichotomous portrait of the innovation diffusion process has however at least two 
limitations. First, both rational and institutional views tend to assume unitary organizational 
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actors that share interests and motivations and that are uniformly affected by identical institu-
tional forces. Yet, organizations are composed of various actors having divergent values, in-
terests and power (Cyert and March, 1963), and the interpretation of innovation attributes 
may differ from one potential adopter to another (Downs and Mohr, 1976; Greenhalgh et al., 
2005).  In this context, innovation benefits and risks may mean different things to different 
people whether inside or outside organizations. Moreover, the institutional reference points 
for different stakeholder groups may be divergent, especially in the pluralistic context of the 
health sector (Ferlie et al., 2005; Kraatz and Block, 2008b).  
This brings us to the second limitation of the dichotomous view – its somewhat artifi-
cial separation of rational and institutional forces. As Scott (Scott, 2008: 69) indicates: “So-
cial action is always grounded in social contexts that specify valued ends and appropriate 
means; action acquires its very reasonableness from taking these social rules and guidelines 
for behavior.” In other words, what counts as rational is itself partly defined and structured by 
the institutional environment (Friedland and Alford, 1991). For example, the values and inter-
ests of physicians – and thus the motivations that drive them – derive partly from the institu-
tional structures in which they work and from the cultural-cognitive assumptions that under-
pin these structures. In turn, the values and interests that physicians uphold have contributed 
over time to the very formation of these structures (Scott, 2008; Scott et al., 2000). Thus, in 
this paper, we view innovation adoption as a socio-political process embedded in and struc-
tured by its institutional context. Drawing on Scott (2008), we now describe the components 
of this context in more detail. 
Components of the Institutional Context 
According to Scott (2008: 48), organizational environments are constituted of institu-
tions which are “comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
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together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social 
life." The regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements contribute to the three com-
ponents of institutional environments defined by Scott (2008): governance structures, institu-
tional logics and institutional actors who serve as carriers or agents of institutions.  
Governance structures are comprised of regulative and normative elements. They are 
defined as the “arrangements by which field-level power and authority are exercised involv-
ing, variously, formal and informal systems, public and private auspices, regulative and nor-
mative mechanisms” (Scott et al., 2000: 173). For example, in a pure market economy, regu-
lations provide the market framework within which actors compete for scarce resources, and 
governmental agencies are expected to correct market failure (Alexander and D'Aunno, 2003) 
by adjusting rules of the game or by providing appropriate financial incentives. In this con-
text, it is generally assumed that competition is the key mechanism by which innovations will 
diffuse, and profit maximization is the incentive for firms to adopt them. Conversely, if the 
administration of organizations in a field is centralized to the state, resources might be allo-
cated according to some centrally determined criterion such as population needs (Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1985). Thus, regulatory mechanisms such as laws and rules will influence the de-
gree to which coercive pressures may be used to force adoption of innovations (Abrahamson, 
1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983) or alternately to control or prevent them. Normative ele-
ments also contribute to innovation diffusion by propagating ideas about what is morally ac-
ceptable and appropriate. For example, in many health care systems, health technology as-
sessment agencies produce studies to inform authorities and providers about the effectiveness 
and safety of medical interventions (Lehoux, 2006). Professional associations may also pro-
mote or hinder change in an institutionalized field (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002) 
as well as the diffusion of innovations. 
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If regulations and normative elements are part of the governance structure, institution-
al logics shape organizational action (Friedland and Alford, 1991) acknowledging key sources 
and meanings of power (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999; 2008) by 
providing interpretive schemes (Barley, 1986; Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980). Institu-
tional logics are defined as “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions – which 
constitute [a field’s] organizing principles and which are available to organizations and indi-
viduals to elaborate” (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248). Institutional logics may thus serve to 
support and legitimize governance structures. 
Scott et al. (2000) identify three institutional logics that emerged sequentially during 
the transformation of health care in the San Francisco Bay area. First, quality of care is a 
longstanding institutional logic that is inherent to health care since its origins. This logic is 
carried by physicians and professional associations who promote technological change in or-
der to provide the best quality services to patients. The emergence of the institutional logic of 
equity of access to health care coincides with the development of universal coverage systems 
in most OECD countries (WHO, 2000) and was supported by governmental bureaucracies. 
However, universal coverage sparked increasing costs that stimulated pressure for enhanced 
control. Taking the private sector as an archetype of success, market mechanisms based on the 
'managed care' concept were introduced in the US, thereby creating a third institutional logic 
which Scott et al. (2002) relates to efficiency. While the health care industries in different 
countries have mixed these logics very differently (Tuohy, 1999), the logics of quality, equity 
and efficiency are inherent in all of them and very much in evidence in the contexts studied 
(Denis, Lamothe, Langley, & Guerard, 2003) as we shall see.  
In Scott et al’s (2000) study, each of these three logics is presumed to be dominant for 
some period of time, thereby sculpting the dynamics of the health care organizational field in 
the United States. While institutional theorists have raised the possibility of multiple logics 
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(e.g. Friedland and Alford, 1991), with some exceptions (e.g., Lounsbury, 2007; Zilber, 
2002), most empirical research has considered them sequentially (Scott et al., 2000; Thornton 
and Ocasio, 1999) rather than simultaneously. In the present study, we recognize that certain 
institutional logics may have greater cultural resonance at particular points in time and in par-
ticular geographic locations. However, the health care field is complex and inherently plura-
listic (Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; Glouberman and Mintzberg, 2001; Kraatz and 
Block, 2008a). Thus, we expect multiple logics to coexist and to influence the diffusion of 
innovations.  
Finally, institutional actors are the third component of the institutional environment 
defined by Scott (2008). Because they create, incarnate and reproduce governance structures 
and institutional logics, they are fundamental institutional carriers (Scott, 2008). They can 
also be powerful agents influencing the diffusion and adoption of innovations according to 
their interests and values. Having established the components of institutions that may influ-
ence diffusion, we now address the role of theorization as a potential contributor to the diffu-
sion of innovations.  
Theorization, Institutional Logics, and the Diffusion of Innovations     
To gain legitimacy, organizations adopt different behaviors ranging from actions such 
as complying to rules, norms and culturally shared beliefs, to manipulating their environment 
by the means of discursive strategies (Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995). By providing general 
abstract models and rationalized causality (Strang and Soule, 1998), "theorization" is a discur-
sive strategy that enhances legitimacy as it contributes to the objectification and taken-for-
grantedness of an innovation (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). While local theorization involves ad 
hoc peer-to-peer interactions to "make sense of the world" (Strang and Meyer, 1993: 493), 
global theorization is believed to accelerate and widen the diffusion of innovation by abstract-
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ly homogenizing a potential population of adopters, by specifying the properties and out-
comes of an innovation, and by identifying theorists behaving according to the theoretical 
model as conduits of diffusion (Strang and Meyer, 1993). The more abstract the theorization, 
the greater its influence. Thus, theorization can be conceptualized as a discursive strategy 
providing rationales, meanings and interpretations that legitimate and make sense of adopting 
innovations. 
To be effective, theorization has to perform two tasks that are 1) specifying an organi-
zational problem, and 2) justifying a solution (Greenwood et al., 2002; Tolbert and Zucker, 
1996). Failing to provide both of these discursive elements would endanger attempts to insti-
tutionalize social practices (Greenwood et al., 2002). In addition, the theorization itself has to 
be perceived as natural, morally appropriate or aligned with interests of strategic actors for an 
innovation to become legitimate and ultimately be diffused (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). When 
applied to the diffusion of technology, theorization has been found to be involved in defining 
the position of new actors in the organizational field, as well as creating new objects and new 
concepts (Munir and Phillips, 2005). Yet, while theorization is associated with the legitima-
tion of novelty, to be effective, it also needs to be embedded in or artfully connected to shared 
cultural understandings (Munir and Phillips, 2005; Strang and Soule, 1998), prevailing dis-
courses (Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006), or institutional logics (Scott et al., 2000). Hence 
actors tend to rely on institutional logics to build theorizations. In this study, it is through the 
study of theorizations generated by organizational actors around the PET scanner technology 
that we attempt to understand how institutional contexts influence the meanings given to the 
technology and how these meanings are in turn mobilized within the process of diffusion.  
Note that our approach is complementary to but different from analyses that have ex-
amined the travel or translation (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska and Sevon, 
1996) of management ideas across different institutional contexts (Boxenbaum, 2006; Sahlin-
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Andersson, 1996). Czarniawska and Sevón (1996) and others have eschewed the word “diffu-
sion” in their studies because it implies a physical metaphor that seems incompatible with the 
fluid nature of management ideas. Instead, they use the word “translation” to express the no-
tion that these ideas are both reinterpreted and transformed as they are embodied in new con-
texts. In our study, the technology considered is indeed a physical object. Yet, while retaining 
its physical integrity, the technology is translated into a new language, or as we describe it 
here, “theorized” in different ways in different settings. In this paper, we do not focus on pat-
terns of transformation of the technology at adopting sites, but rather on the means and mean-
ings mobilized in decisions to acquire it.  
We have now put in place the key a priori conceptual elements needed to develop our 
understanding of the role of institutional contexts in the diffusion process. Further conceptual 
developments will emerge following the presentation of the data.   
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY 
Research Context 
The PET scanner is a complex imaging technology for diagnosing cancer, cardiac and 
neurological diseases. Its applications as well as its high acquisition cost (2 million USD / 
machine) and running cost (1.5 million USD / year) suggested analogies with other technolo-
gies that were known to have been subject to bandwagon pressures. Experts agree that about 
one PET scanner for each million of population is sufficient for clinical and research purposes 
(Cleemput, Camberlin, Van den Bruel, & Ramaekers, 2008). 
In order to show how different institutional environments may differentially impact 
patterns of diffusion of this technology, the study compares jurisdictions with contrasting 
modes of governance: the publicly funded Quebec health care system and the more market-
oriented Swiss health care system. Both jurisdictions have similar populations (around 7.5 
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million2) and are sufficiently small to enable an in-depth study including virtually all individ-
ual adoption decisions of the PET scanner up to 2006.  
The Quebec health care system is publicly run and highly centralized. The Ministry of 
Health funds the system from tax revenues and negotiates global budgets with hospitals, pays 
doctors (largely on a fee-for-service basis according to a fixed schedule) and covers the cost 
of other health care professionals within recognized health care institutions. The health care 
system is also highly regulated. For expensive technologies such as the PET scanner, the Min-
istry of Health must authorize hospitals to acquire the technology and in principle, it supplies 
the operating and acquisition budgets, although hospitals may have access to some capital 
funding from private foundations. There is currently no co-payment for patients for medically 
necessary services, and a Health Technology Assessment Agency makes recommendations 
concerning which technologies should be reimbursed by the state.  
In contrast, the Swiss health care system is more decentralized and market oriented, al-
though unlike the US, all Swiss citizens are covered for basic health care. The system has two 
main levels of decision making. The Internal Federal Department (IFD) is the highest political 
body in this country. Switzerland is divided into 23 cantons that are sovereign with respect to 
the health care organization in their territory, and with respect to the financing of expensive 
medical technologies. Thus, each canton has its own agenda as to which technologies should 
be adopted. Switzerland has no formal health technology assessment agency. In this health 
care system, it is a federal competence to authorize the reimbursement of medical interven-
tions and technologies, while in most of the cantons, public hospitals require the authorization 
of the cantonal government before acquiring a PET scanner, and they are reimbursed by 
health insurance.   
                                                 
2 The population of Quebec was estimated to be 7,546,131 in the 2006 Canadian census (Statistics Canada, 2007). The popu-
lation of Switzerland was estimated at 7,508,739 in 2006 (Office fédéral de la statistique, 2007). 
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Unlike the Quebec health care system where there is a single payer covering all essen-
tial medical interventions, Switzerland had 87 different insurance companies offering basic 
health plans in 2006. Switzerland also has parallel public and private hospitals. In both juris-
dictions, PET scanner procedures were universally covered although at different times: for 
Switzerland in 1993, and in 1998 for Quebec. In addition to premiums and taxes, patients 
have to pay a deductible ranging from 300 CHF to 2500 CHF and to pay a 10% out-of-pocket 
fee after the deductible is attained. Moreover, while a unified tariff is applied throughout 
Quebec, this was not the case in Switzerland before January 2004 when providers had to ne-
gotiate locally with the Cantonal Health Association the tariff to be reimbursed for each med-
ical intervention. With the introduction of a unified tariff (called TARMED) in 2004, private 
clinics were certain to obtain the same tariff as public organizations. Table 1 summarizes the 
main differences between the governance structures of the two health care systems.  
TABLE 1:  
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF THE QUEBEC AND SWISS HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEMS 
Dimensions Québec Switzerland 
Economy More centrally planned More market oriented 
Centralization Centralized Decentralized 
Funding sources One Many
Authorization to buy expensive 
technology 
From the central government From the cantonal governments 
Financing the operation of expen-
sive technologies 
Operational budget from the central 
government 
Authorization to reimburse from 
the federal government 
Physician payments Fee-for-service (capped) Hospitals: Salaried 
Private: fee-for-service 
Ambulatory Hospital Payment Global Budget Fee-for-service 
Technology Assessment Agency One None
Health insurance companies One Many
Types of hospitals Public Public and private 
 
Research Design and Data Collection 
The research involved a comparative and retrospective case study design with embed-
ded units of analysis (Yin, 2003). The two jurisdictions constitute extreme cases in terms of 
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governance structures while having sufficient similarities in terms of population size to allow 
useful comparisons (Eisenhardt, 1989). To understand the key features of the two institutional 
contexts, documentary data about each health care system were collected and reviewed.  
Data on the adoption and diffusion process itself were collected from two sources. 
First, 84 semi-structured interviews were carried out at all levels of analysis in each jurisdic-
tion: national (federal), regional (cantonal) and at each adoption site. In Quebec, 41 interviews 
were conducted of which 32 lasted between 40 to 110 minutes, and 9 between 20 to 40 mi-
nutes; in Switzerland, 43 interviews were performed of which 35 lasted 40 to 110 minutes, 
and 8 between 20 to 40 minutes. Respondents were asked to explain what the technology 
meant to them and to describe the decision processes in which they were involved. Internal 
and external documents were also collected and analyzed to establish process chronologies, to 
examine written theorizations of the technology, and for triangulation purposes (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Patton, 2002). 
Data Analysis 
To compare the diffusion patterns, a detailed narrative was first constructed for each 
case iterating between episodes of data collection and analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Each individual adoption or attempt at adoption in both Quebec and Swit-
zerland was documented and analyzed in terms of three categories: the rationales used by 
adopters, their actions and their results. Visual mapping strategies as well as matrix displays 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) were used to synthesize the data (Langley, 1999) and to com-
pare the evolution of the processes across the two jurisdictions.  
Data analysis led us to identify struggles between actors in the organizational field 
along two axes: vertical and horizontal. On the one hand, “vertical struggles” refer to confron-
tations between the regulator (Ministry of Health in Quebec, various agencies in Switzerland) 
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and other institutional actors. We use the term “horizontal struggle” to refer to the competi-
tion among institutional actors for scarce resources. As we shall see in the analysis, although 
the Quebec health care system is not theoretically a competitive market, competition among 
health care providers nevertheless permeated the diffusion process. We also came to qualify 
these struggles in terms of two inter-related modes of action: struggles for meaning, in which 
participants drew explicitly on different theorizations to justify their positions and to interpret 
the technology in terms that were favorable to them; and struggles for control in which orga-
nizational actors mobilized authority and material resources to achieve their goals. We opera-
tionalized the notion of theorization (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Strang and Soule, 1998; Tol-
bert and Zucker, 1996) to include statements dealing with four questions: what was the pur-
pose of the technology, why the technology should be adopted, who should adopt it, and how 
it should be diffused.  
We now present narratives of the diffusion processes in Switzerland and Quebec, em-
phasizing how struggles for meaning and struggles for control punctuated the processes and 
influenced their outcomes. 
THE DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN QUEBEC AND SWITZERLAND 
Prior to detailing the key events in each diffusion narrative, it is important to note cer-
tain commonalities. First, in both jurisdictions, it is clear that the PET scanner took on the 
qualities of a “bandwagon” technology. The governance structures in both institutional con-
texts afforded incentives for doctors and hospitals to adopt the technology as quickly as poss-
ible – and preferably in advance of rivals – in order to provide the best care for patients, con-
solidate their prestige, maintain their position with respect to others providers, attract patients 
and doctors, enhance revenues and remain viable sites for clinical research. This urge to adopt 
lies at the root of the horizontal struggles mentioned above and is illustrated by the following 
quotations from interviews in the two jurisdictions: 
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TABLE 2:  
THE PET SCANNER AS A BANDWAGON TECHNOLOGY 
 Quebec Switzerland 
Best care 
Beating the com-
petition 
If we want to give the best cancer care, we have to 
have this equipment. There’s competition between 
the general hospital and the teaching hospital to 
determine who will dominate cancer programs in 
the region. 
Losing this technology would mean weakening our 
cancer institute in relation to the competition and 
we can’t allow that if we want to remain leaders in 
this sector.  
Benefits to doc-
tors 
We learn things and we have the impression that 
we are giving better services to clients. And its an 
activity that generally brings in revenues… 
This way, Nuclear Medicine doctors gained an 
addition 150’000 CHF a year per doctor.” 
Maintaining 
research viability 
At X university, they are excluded from over 30 
multi-centre clinical protocols [for lack of a PET 
scanner]. They become regional, they can’t have 
an impact.  
To position ourselves in research. [They] don’t 
award pharmaceuticals projects if the institute 
does not have a PET scanner.   
Prestige, attrac-
tiveness 
Pride in having something that others don’t have. 
The pride or desire to be bigger… always bigger.  
The CEO of the teaching hospital needed a new 
boss for the nuclear medicine department, and he 
had to offer a PET scanner [to make the hospital 
attractive]. 
 
At the same time, regulatory bodies in both institutional contexts attempted to control 
the diffusion of the technology (with greater or lesser success), driven by concerns about ef-
fectiveness, efficiency and economy. This is what gave rise to the vertical struggles. Never-
theless, as shown in Table 1, the mix of governance mechanisms is clearly more market-
driven in Switzerland. The overall result in terms of the diffusion process was, as might have 
been expected and as shown in Figure 1, much faster and deeper diffusion in Switzerland than 
in Quebec. These data are interesting and revealing in themselves. However, they do not tell 
us anything about the actual processes by which diffusion took place, and in particular how 
the tensions we have just described played themselves out. A key purpose of this paper is to 
open up this black box. We now describe the diffusion processes in each jurisdiction. Rather 
than presenting an exhaustive portrait of each process, we emphasize a sample of four epi-
sodes in Quebec and four episodes in Switzerland that are particularly revealing of the dy-
namics at play.  
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FIGURE 1:  
DIFFUSION OF THE PET SCANNER IN QUEBEC AND SWITZERLAND 
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Diffusion of the PET Scanner in Quebec 
After the early acquisition of a PET scanner in Region A for research purposes, teach-
ing hospital THB located in a town of about 150,000 people somewhat distant from the main 
centres of population in Quebec, acquired a PET scanner through the entrepreneurship of a 
local nuclear doctor. The first use of the PET scanner in a clinical setting in this relatively 
small and remote area was funded through the hospital budget. It aroused consternation 
among nuclear doctors in teaching hospitals around the province, and was deemed irrational 
given the small population of the region. This prompted those hospitals to pressure for a PET 
scanner for themselves. In addition, the decision of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services in USA to authorize the reimbursement of the PET scanner for lung cancer as well as 
the wide and fast diffusion of this technology in USA contributed to build up pressure on the 
Ministry of Health to more widely diffuse the technology. We now describe and analyse four 
episodes in the diffusion process of the PET scanner in this organizational field. 
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Episode Q1: Horizontal struggles for meaning in Region C.  
While the acquisition of the PET scanner by hospital THB encountered no competition 
either locally or provincially, the competition to acquire a scanner between the general hospit-
al GHC, a specialized hospital in cardiology and in lung cancer, and the teaching hospital 
THC, the most important teaching hospital in the area impeded attempts at adoption in Region 
C. In their struggles to convince the Ministry of Health to acquire a PET scanner for clinical 
as well as for research purposes, both hospitals submitted reports to the Regional Health 
Board in 1997 and 1998, and later in new updated versions in 2001. These reports drew on 
competing theorizations of the PET scanner technology, illustrating what we have called 
struggles for meaning. In this case, as shown in Table 3, both hospitals mobilized an institu-
tional logic related to the quality of care – one of the logics suggested by Scott et al. (2000) as 
underlying health care systems. However, the meanings they attempted to impose on the 
technology were different.  
Specifically, because of its dual mission in cardiology and in lung cancer, hospital 
GHC declared itself to be the best centre to receive a PET scanner. Hospital GHC contended 
that its supra-regional mission combined with it being the hospital performing the highest 
number of cardiac surgical operations justified obtaining a scanner. Since the evidence on the 
potential in the case of lung cancer was indisputable, hospital GHC also highlighted the fact 
they were performing the highest number of surgeries in pulmonary cancer. In contrast, teach-
ing hospital THC argued that oncology was the main application of the scanner. Given that 
more than half of the clinical activities in oncology in region C were performed at the teach-
ing hospital THC, it argued that it should be the first centre to adopt a machine. Also, since 
the cyclotron was an essential ingredient to produce radiopharmaceuticals, its location also 
became an issue. Because the half-life of the radiopharmaceutical used in cardiology is ap-
proximately 2 minutes, hospital GHC argued that the cyclotron should be close to their build-
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ing. Emphasizing its mission in research and in evaluating new technology, teaching hospital 
THC argued that the cyclotron should be in their organization.  
TABLE 3:  
COMPETING QUALITY-BASED THEORIZATIONS IN REGION C 
THEORIZATION COM-
PONENTS 
Hospital THC: PET for oncology Hospital GHC: PET for cardiology 
What to adopt? Definition 
of the innovation 
 
Oncology vs. Cardiology 
 PET as a research tool 
 PET as a clinical tool for oncology 
 
Argument supported by one article contain-
ing a systematic review of evidence support-
ing PET for oncology. 
 
"Clinical indications for the PET technology 
are by order of importance, oncology (over 
18 pathologies for which indications are 
recognized), neurology (2 indications), and 
cardiology (1 indication)."  
 PET as a clinical tool for cardiology and 
pulmonary oncology 
 
Argument supported by reference to 51 studies, 42 
of which provide evidence for cardiac applica-
tions. 
 
"The two areas where clinical use and poten-
tial are best developed and recognized are 
precisely for heart disease and lung cancer." 
Why adopt? 
 
Quality-based logics but  
different definitions of the 
innovation 
 PET has several clinical advantages
 
Early diagnosis of cancer 
Early evaluation of the effectiveness of 
anticancer therapeutic interventions 
 PET scanner is effective 
 
"Several studies confirmed the high diagnostic 
performance of the PET scanner for the detection 
of heart disease."
Who should adopt and 
how? 
 
Common quality-based 
arguments based on differ-
ent definitions of the inno-
vation 
 
Asymmetric quality-based 
arguments based on compe-
tence 
 
 
 
Asymmetric efficiency-
based arguments 
 Those whose missions and activities 
are aligned with the technology 
 
"The strong points of the hospital were that 
it was a large hospital treating more than 
half of the clinical activity in oncology in the 
region." 
 
 Those with appropriate competence 
"At THC, there was already a physician 
team. We had hired two nuclear doctors who 
were trained or in training with fellowships 
of a least a year."  
 
 Those whose missions and activities are 
aligned with the technology 
 
"GHC  is a designated university institute in car-
diology and pneumology where the highest num-
ber of heart surgeries are undertaken each year. It 
is also the centre with the highest number of lung 
cancer surgeries" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Those who need the cyclotron close to their 
installation 
"Our argument at GHC was that we needed the 
cyclotron in cardiology given the short half-lives 
of radiopharmaceuticals in this speciality" 
 
Somewhat paradoxically, these self-interested arguments and destructive battles did 
not contribute to helping accelerate the diffusion of the technology given that the government 
wanted to limit diffusion to one machine: “Faced with these battles, what do the government 
administrators do? They don’t make a decision. They don’t really know.” In other words, 
competition expressed via struggles over meaning – the only legitimate means of acquiring 
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the technology in the Quebec health care system, placed governmental bodies in a quandary 
and initially at least did not move adoption forward. 
Episode Q2: Consolidating meaning: The Health Technology Assessment Agency Report. 
 Quarrels in region C, the first clinical use of the technology in Quebec, the authorization to 
reimburse the PET scanner procedure by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in 
USA, and the emerging evidence in the scientific literature praising the clinical benefits of the 
PET scanner stimulated the president of the Quebec Medical Association to ask the Ministry 
of Health to produce a report on the cost-effectiveness of this technology.  
The clinical conclusions of the Health Technology Assessment Agency report pub-
lished in October 2001 were unequivocal. The need for more PET scanners was undeniable, 
and at least 15,000 exams were said to be required annually. Although the report does not 
proclaim any application (cardiology, oncology, neurology) as being dominant, it definitively 
supports its legitimacy. The following quotations from interviews support our contention that 
from then on the technology was perceived as legitimate from a clinical point of view. The 
technology is described as an essential medical tool based on a quality of care institutional 
logic. 
"It's like asking whether you need an operating room in a hos-
pital. (…) It's an indispensable and necessary tool." (Nuclear doc-
tor) 
"It's inevitable; it's a question of the quality of medicine. Some 
will even say that it is bad medical practice not to use it in di-
agnosis." (Medical Association Official) 
"After the Health Technology Assessment Agency report, the 
first and most visible impact is that we rapidly received many 
demands from the hospitals that were all referring to this re-
port." (Biomedical engineer) 
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Episode Q3: Struggles for meanings grounded in access and quality institutional logics.  
Yet while the report clarified the quality-based legitimacy of the PET scanner, it paved the 
way for further struggles over the meaning of the technology that drew on different institu-
tional logics. Indeed, the recommendations of the report suggesting that the PET scanner 
technology should be "progressively deployed in collaboration with teaching hospitals and 
university institutes" and "through research activities" raised several concerns among nuclear 
doctors. The recommendations were perceived by the Quebec Medical Association as a signal 
that the PET scanner technology was going to be diffused to teaching hospitals only given 
their research mission. This was perceived by the Medical Association as a way of favoring 
research at the expense of clinical applications. To counter these recommendations, the Medi-
cal Association created a special committee rallying nuclear doctors in remote hospitals, and 
began to directly negotiate with the Government in power. 
By primarily defining the PET scanner as a clinical device and not a research tool, the aim of 
this special committee was to counter the recommendations favoring teaching hospitals, and 
to democratize access to this high-end medical technology by proposing that 12 major centres 
in oncology should obtain a PET scanner, but at once and not progressively. The debate over 
how the technology should be diffused intensified with the availability of the PET-CT scan-
ner, a new machine that combined two existing technologies. Because the CT scanner pro-
vides quasi instantaneous anatomical images, the combination of both technologies increased 
the precision of the diagnosis. 
The parallel development of the PET-CT turned the struggle into a confrontation be-
tween two clans: the Pro-Stand-alone-PET clan which favored the diffusion of 12 PET scan-
ners against the Pro-PET-CT coalition which wanted to diffuse the technology progressively 
from teaching hospitals to regional hospitals. Because the cost of a PET-CT ($3.7 millions 
US) was twice the price of Stand-alone PET, promoting the diffusion of the former was 
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equivalent to encouraging narrower diffusion given that only $23 millions US were available 
in the provincial budget, and that infrastructure building cost had to be taken into account. 
The advent of the PET-CT was not good news for the pro-Stand-alone-PET coalition. 
Table 4 illustrates the struggle for meaning that ensued. Competing theorizations of 
the technology were put forward by representatives of the Medical Association and by the 
teaching hospitals. As can be seen, these theorizations draw respectively on institutional log-
ics of equity of access in the first case and quality in the second case: the parallel metaphors 
used by some of our interviewees to justify who should be allowed to have the technology in 
Table 4 are both picturesque and revealing.  
 
TABLE 4:  
Competing Theorizations Following the Health Technology Assessment Report 
THEORIZATION 
COMPONENTS 
Stand-alone PET 
Access-based logic 
PET-CT 
Quality-based logic 
What to adopt? Defi-
nition of the innova-
tion 
 
 PET as a proven clinical tool needed 
by all regardless of location 
 PET-CT as a high-performing proven 
clinical and research tool 
Why adopt? 
Legitimacy grounded 
in equity of access-
based arguments vs. 
quality-based argu-
ments 
 
 
 
 
Competing interpreta-
tions of efficiency-
based logic tied to 
access-based and quali-
ty-based arguments 
respectively 
 
 
Asymmetric naturaliza-
tion arguments 
 PET scan for all 
"Chemotherapy is hard as a treatment. That's 
why with the PET scanner, we can evaluate 
whether local radiotherapy or chemotherapy 
would be better and protect the child from 
suffering. [...] Just think if you have a 12 
year-old child who needs radiotherapy and 
you have to send them to the big city. It's 
torture." 
 
 Low purchase costs and lower travel 
costs with greater equity and access 
"Oncology is permanent. You have your 
cancer, you come back, you are re-evaluated. 
There's a lot of travelling. So the PET will 
allow the regionalization of care, keeping 
resources, people, and avoiding excessive 
travel costs."  
 
 Better quality diagnoses 
"A PET scanner will locate the tumor… in the 
body but not in a specific way. It will say: it is 
there. But with the CT, we can take a tomograph-
ic image which will locate the tumor in the tissue 
so we can see exactly where it is." 
 
 
 
 Lower cost per examination with higher 
quality 
"An ordinary PET scanner can do about six or 
seven patients per day. With the PET-CT, we can 
go up to 12 so we can double the volume. " 
 
 
 
 Inevitability of PET-CT 
"[In the conference] basically nobody was speak-
ing of Stand-alone PET. Nobody. [...] I can’t 
think of a single institution that has actively gone 
to tender for Stand-alone PET." 
Who should adopt 
and how? 
 
Distribution based on 
equity (access-based 
logic) vs. competence 
(quality-based logic). 
 
 
 PET for all, coherence with prior 
distribution of oncology centres 
"Better give everyone a good Chrysler than 
giving a Ferrari to 3 or 4 people, that's what 
we wanted at the Association."  
"With the government, we proposed that the 
15,000 exams that were necessary per year in 
oncology, that the 12 first pieces of equip-
ment be installed in the regional centres for 
 Competence has to be developed first 
before allowing adoption 
« They’ll say, « I am a Cessna pilot, I can also 
pilot a 747.” People will say that, but it makes no 
sense! (..) They’ll say: “It’s not complicated – I’ll 
put it on automatic pilot.” OK, but is that the 
function of a 747 pilot? So you’ll place your life 
in the hands of someone who doesn’t have the 
expertise necessary to make complex and major 
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 oncology " adjustments that a technology like that requires.”
Again, these struggles for meaning were not helpful in enabling the government to 
make decisions as to how the technology should be disseminated. The opposing theorizations 
draw on institutional logics that both have strong cultural-cognitive resonance in the context 
of the Quebec health care system. However, they lead to completely opposite conclusions. 
Discursive struggles alone were insufficient to resolve this issue 
Episode Q4: Beyond struggles for meaning: Pre-emptive adoptions in Region A. The 
competition between the two factions placed the government in an uncomfortable position 
since opting for one or other solution was politically very difficult. This tended to reaffirm the 
status quo despite repeated applications from hospitals to obtain a PET scanner, and disillu-
sionment and cynicism from many nuclear doctors: 
"The deployment of PET scanners, I've been hearing about that 
for four years, and another announcement arrives every 15th of 
the month. It's the classic running gag. I've stopped believing in 
that." 
Eventually, unanswered applications to the government for a PET scanner prompted 
teaching hospital THA1 to acquire a machine without the consent of the Ministry of Health. 
To bypass the regulations, THA1 convinced its private foundation to buy and rent the PET 
scanner to the hospital for a symbolic sum. By January 2003, the scanner was functional. To 
justify this maneuver, THA1 suggested to the authorities that they consider the machine as a 
research tool although everyone knew that it was more than this. Because hospital THA1 was 
in a position to publicly justify the need for a PET scanner in oncology, it seemed unlikely 
that the government would denounce it. Given that access to health care is a public service in 
Quebec, people could not at that time pay privately for health services that were insured by 
universal coverage. Despite this rule, THA1 had to find a way to finance the running costs of 
its scanner. The solution was to offer the PET scanner at nights and on weekends on a private 
basis to private clinics or patients willing to pay to jump the waiting list. This provoked a 
26/47 
swift reaction from the Minister of Health who asked THA1 to stop selling public services to 
the private sector. In exchange, the government would provide them with an operational 
budget. Teaching hospital THA1 immediately complied, having successfully won its point.  
This delinquent behavior was taken up by other hospitals that also launched the 
process for adopting a PET-CT even though they had not yet received the formal consent 
from the government. For those hospitals with access to financial resources, this was actually 
a good strategy to obtain a PET scanner before others.  
Summarizing the Quebec case. The Quebec case study shows how bandwagon pres-
sures for adoption of an advanced technology played themselves out in a public health care 
system in which the government, as single payer is committed to limiting the diffusion of the 
PET scanner by taking a strict cost-containment approach, a position that appears justifiable 
given that the government covers almost all health care expenditures in this institutional field. 
Competition about who should adopt manifests itself in struggles for meaning where different 
would-be adopters develop theorizations of the technology (what it is, why it should be 
adopted, who and how it should be adopted) grounded in the institutional logics underlying 
the health system but oriented towards their interests. However, faced with competing and 
incompatible but equally legitimate logics, government bodies find themselves in a difficult 
position in arbitrating between these claims. At this point, the struggles moved to a different 
level. 
In fact, the legitimacy of the technology derived from wide diffusion outside this or-
ganizational field and the endorsement of the PET scanner by the Health Technology As-
sessment Agency report as an essential tool in diagnosing life threatening conditions (cancer) 
opened the door for organizations with sufficient political clout and financial resources to 
adopt the technology preemptively without government consent. The established legitimacy 
of the technology as an essential clinical tool based on the quality and access logics embedded 
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in the institutional context minimized the risk incurred by delinquents in bypassing govern-
ment rules: 
“Put yourself in the shoes of the Minister who comes to tell us: 
“Whoah! You are going to get the machine out of there and you 
are not going to use it.” That’s a risky business. If that went to 
the media, we would have several very sensible and logical ex-
planations to give to the people. The government would look 
pretty silly. (…) Especially as there are so many cancer cases… 
[the government wouldn’t want to hear us] tell patients, “Well 
– we’re ready to offer you a useful service, but the Minister has 
decided that you can’t have it” Politically, you have to be care-
ful.” 
To avoid losing face and to avoid endorsing the supply of services by the private sec-
tor, the government quickly came up with a dissemination plan that gave the powerful health 
care providers what they wanted, favoring in the process teaching hospitals and the general 
hospital GHA in the main urban centers with access to financial resources, and implicitly re-
cognizing and legitimating their theorizations.  
Diffusion of the PET scanner in Switzerland 
As in Quebec, early adoptions of PET scanners in Switzerland were devoted to devel-
oping the technology for research purposes. However, it was the unexpected donation from a 
patient to the teaching hospital THU in canton U that literally opened up the technology for 
clinical use. At this point, the key issue was the question of obtaining reimbursement for PET 
scanner procedures. This manifested itself in vertical struggles between the Federal govern-
ment and the health care providers. We present four episodes in the diffusion of the PET 
scanner in Switzerland, the first two oriented around the key issue of reimbursement and the 
other three oriented around local competitive issues in specific cantons.  
Episode S1: Early struggles for meaning at federal level. Under the initiative of 
teaching hospital THU, the drive to obtain reimbursement for PET procedures was organized 
through a national consensus conference and involved among others two teaching hospitals 
and an official of the Federal Department of Health. While the federal government official 
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was requesting evidence on patient management, nuclear doctors were presenting evidence 
related to the high quality of functional images produced by the PET scanner. By so doing, 
each group was mobilizing a different dimension of a quality-based institutional logic by de-
fining the effectiveness of the technology differently. 
The high quality of images finally convinced the federal government official to allow 
reimbursement of some PET scanner procedures in cardiology and neurology because the 
population might benefit from this technology. However, since Swiss law requires that to be 
included in the compulsory reimbursement list, new procedures must be proven to be effec-
tive, appropriate and cost-efficient the Federal Department of Health could not authorize this 
reimbursement since the PET scanner did not fulfill any of these criteria at the time. To per-
mit the reimbursement of the PET scanner, the Federal Department of Health wrote an ordin-
ance which amended the Law and which stated that promising new technologies could be 
reimbursed as long as health care providers were nominated by the government and provided 
they agreed to evaluate new technologies in order to build evidence on the impact of the tech-
nology in terms of patient management. Nominating centers and forcing evaluation was a 
good cost-containment strategy and a tactic to accumulate evidence on patient management. 
Only two centers were nominated for reimbursement at this point: teaching hospitals THU in 
Canton U and teaching hospital THV in canton V. Because PET providers had to invest in the 
evaluation of the technology, a fairly generous reimbursement rate was authorized, attracting 
interest in the technology from other potential providers. Reimbursement of two indications in 
oncology (cancer) was added in 1997 under similar conditions. 
Up to this point, quality and efficiency-based logics ostensibly dominated the scene. 
However, the nomination of the two teaching hospitals as sole legitimate providers would 
soon be contested, as other providers attempted to move into this terrain. Note that while 
presence on the Federal reimbursement list was necessary for procedures to be reimbursed on 
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a compulsory basis, providers could also try to negotiate directly with their cantonal insurance 
associations. This situation led to a new struggle around the meaning of the technology in 
canton S.   
Episode S2: Struggles for meaning grounded in market and efficiency based logics. 
The new reimbursement in oncology paved the way for the extensive use of this technology, 
and engendered a struggle between the teaching hospital THS and the private hospital PHS to 
obtain the authorization of the cantonal government to acquire a PET scanner. However, the 
cantonal authorities estimated that two PET scanners were too many for this relatively small 
cantonal population (around 450,000 people) and feared this would contribute to increasing 
health care costs. While these two hospitals were struggling, the unexpected acquisition of a 
PET scanner in 1998 by private clinic PCS in the same canton, and maybe more importantly 
its application to be added to the reimbursement list surprised the federal government. How-
ever, uncertainty related to the clinical effectiveness of the technology, which was still under 
evaluation, and the fear of seeing widespread and chaotic diffusion of PET scanners made the 
Federal Government reluctant to open up the list to other providers, and especially to private 
providers who might be more interested in making a profit than in evaluating the technology. 
"...because we had a new law for introducing new technologies 
more quickly, and Mister X just wanted to make a profit. He 
wanted to make money with that. It upset all our system for in-
troducing new technology.” 
Since the federal government did not respond to the request of the private clinic PCS, 
a law firm was hired to bring a lawsuit against the Federal Department of Health before the 
Federal Tribunal of Insurance. The law firm argued that the ordinance was too restrictive and 
was contrary to the free practice of medicine in a free market. Given that the Swiss Constitu-
tion asserts that the State can restrain free market competition if it is in the public interest, the 
Federal Department of Health argued that nominating two centers was a good way to limit 
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cost while providing access to the population to advanced technologies. Table 5 synthesizes 
the resulting theorizations of the technology used by both parties.  
 
TABLE 5:  
Competing Theorizations Surrounding Reimbursement in Switzerland 
Theorization components Quality and efficiency-based logics 
 
Government/ Two main centres
Free Market-based Logic 
 
Private Clinic and other providers 
What to adopt  
Definition of the innovation 
PET scanner in oncology, but also in cardi-
ology and neurology 
PET scanner in oncology, but also in cardi-
ology and neurology 
Why adopt or not? 
 
 
 
 
Legitimation essentially tied 
to efficiency and quality-
based arguments in the first 
case vs. pure free-market-
based arguments in the 
second 
The PET scanner is still being evaluated. It 
may be a valuable technology, but this is 
uncertain and adoption should be controlled 
for cost-containment reasons.  
 
We attempted to defend a system of open 
social insurance with complete modern 
services for all citizens but at a reasonable 
financial cost.  
Because the PET scanner should be available 
to all health care providers, to freely practice 
medicine as they see fit. 
 
 
[The firm] mobilized liberal economic argu-
ment, about open markets, the right to exer-
cise the medical profession as freely and as 
completely as possible, even invoking the 
European convention on human rights. 
Who should adopt (be 
reimbursed), and how? 
 
Legitimation grounded in 
quality and efficiency-
based arguments vs. free 
market-based arguments 
Two nominated centres only because they 
have the expertise to evaluate the technology  
 
The two centres were the initatiors. We 
wanted to limit it to the two centres to allow 
the evaluation of the technology. 
All organizations wishing to offer PET scan-
ner procedures. 
 
Normally, everyone[providers] should be 
able to use this technology 
 
Due to the non-response from the Federal Department of Health, the Federal Tribunal 
of Insurance rejected the lawsuit because “no decision was made” in this case. Although the 
lawsuit did not give the private clinic PCS a victory, it made the Federal Department of 
Health react quickly. Indeed, based on this lawsuit, the head of the department calculated that 
the position of the government would be difficult to defend before the Swiss Anti-trust Com-
mission. Because many centres were by then sending letters to the Federal government to be 
added to the reimbursement list, the head of the Federal Department of Health considered re-
evaluating the concept of having a positive list of two PET centres. 
There were fears that centres that had not been included in the 
list could appeal to the anti-trust commission and therefore 
question the legitimacy of federal authorities to designate [PET 
scanner] centres. (…) We would have had some trouble defend-
ing the list.  
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Thus, in August 1999, the Federal Commission for Health Insurance created a PET 
Study Group to develop a new way to nominate PET centres. By June 2000, this study group 
proposed nominating centres on the basis of quality criteria, such as having a machine with 
minimal technical requirements, hiring a nuclear doctor to interpret clinical results and main-
taining a registry of PET scanner activities. Quality criteria were chosen because they are per-
ceived as being legitimate by Government officials, and were to be in force by January 2001. 
Meanwhile, with the unexpected acquisition of the PET scanner by the private clinic PCS in 
canton S, the cantonal government S granted authorization for a PET scanner to the teaching 
hospital THS and the private hospital PHS if they agree to share one machine for the two hos-
pitals. By July 2000, both hospitals agreed to buy one PET scanner. This episode interestingly 
reveals the power of the market-based logic in Switzerland as compared with Quebec. Al-
though the market-based theorization failed to give the private clinic what it wanted, its law-
suit and the threat of further market-based contests forced the government to reconsider its 
criteria for reimbursement, essentially opening up the diffusion of the technology to all-
comers with a basic set of credentials. Nevertheless, decisions about acquisitions within the 
cantons depended on the specific rules for approval established by cantonal governments. We 
now look at two interesting episodes occurring in other cantons that again reveal the dynamics 
of this institutional context.  
Epsiode S3: Bypassing vertical control through horizontal collaboration in Canton 
N. With the intention of remaining competitive at the national level, teaching hospital THN in 
canton N ordered a business plan to evaluate the profitability of opening a nuclear medicine 
unit and a PET scanner. As the conclusion of the report was positive, the hospital tried to per-
suade the cantonal authority to approve a PET scanner in order to attract a good head of de-
partment. However, the cantonal government refused the application, invoking the already 
high number of PET scanners in Switzerland. 
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"The official line was that five PET scanners in Switzerland are 
enough, so they [the politicians of the Canton N] didn’t want to 
have a PET scanner in the Canton N." 
In the face of a categorical “no”, teaching hospital THN and private hospital PHN, in-
stead of competing for patients, agreed to build together a private company with the dedicated 
mission of offering PET scanner procedures. Given the size of the population (about 950,000 
people) this arrangement was profitable for both parties and given that this was a private 
company, the approval of the canton was not required. The private company acquired a PET 
scanner in August 2001. 
Episode S4: Vertical and horizontal struggles in Canton D. Being interested for years 
in owning a PET scanner, the PET working group at teaching hospital THD attempted to con-
vince the cantonal government to authorize such an acquisition. A financial-economic study 
was performed and favored an auto-financed PET Unit. This implied that Teaching Hospital 
THD would loan money to the PET Unit and in exchange would reimburse the hospital with 
the profit generated. However, the Cantonal Government resisted. Having heard of the immi-
nent adoption of a SPECT scanner by private clinic PCD2 in the canton, the cantonal gov-
ernment preferred to carefully study whether a PET scanner would perform the same type of 
diagnoses as the SPECT scanner. Because there is a norm, at least in this canton, that the pub-
lic sector should not provide what is supplied by the private sector, the cantonal government 
was disinclined to let the public hospital acquire a PET scanner. 
The official didn’t believe in new technologies and he was sen-
sitive to requests from the private sector. That’s how it is in 
Switzerland. When the private sector takes charge, we believe 
that the public sector shouldn’t be involved. 
Once the cantonal government knew the SPECT scanner was not as powerful as the 
PET scanner, it finally provided its consent nearly one year after the financial-economic study 
was written, and the machine was adopted in November 2002. This episode again illustrates 
the key role of the market-based logic in the context of the Swiss health care system, where 
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public officials come to the defense of private interests against public ones – something that 
would not have been seen as legitimate in Quebec. 
Summarizing the Swiss case. The Swiss case shows how initially tight controls on the 
diffusion of technology grounded in quality and efficiency logics rapidly gave way to the do-
minance of market-based logics of diffusion as the legitimacy of initial reimbursement rules 
(that gave a virtual monopoly to two providers) were called into question.  
In terms of vertical struggles, cantonal governments sometimes attempted to use quali-
ty and efficiency criteria to hold back diffusion. However the decentralized nature of the go-
vernance structures allowed private providers to enter the market and enabled public provid-
ers to bypass constraints through a variety of strategic behaviors including collaboration with 
the private sector (as in episode S3). Moreover, even public providers began to emphasize 
efficiency and market-based theorizations in their proposals because the main preoccupation 
of cantonal authorities was that the technology would pay for itself.  
While hospitals competed aggressively to get access to the PET scanner and the re-
sources they could potentially derive from it, other hospitals already controlling the technolo-
gy strove to increase entry barriers, lobbying authorities to prevent further adoptions. To sum 
up the process: 
“Everyone was fighting locally to get their machine and at the 
federal level, we were fighting together to get reimbursed.” 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: HOW THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
SHAPES THE DIFFUSION PROCESS  
It is striking that neither of the two cases described suggests a highly ordered diffusion 
process driven primarily by a rational evaluation of patient needs, the equitable distribution of 
resources and cost effectiveness calculations. Rather, in both cases, as we have described, the 
technology diffusion process playing out over time is marked by two kinds of competitive and 
political struggles: horizontal struggles between different health care institutions competing to 
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acquire the technology faster than their rivals, and vertical struggles between would-be adop-
ters and regulatory bodies attempting to influence diffusion, often by restraining it. As we 
have seen, these struggles manifest themselves in two distinct but interacting forms of action: 
struggles for control and struggles for meaning.  
Actors engage in struggles for control by strategically mobilizing power in the form of 
material resources, authority and expertise. While the power of both governments lies partly 
in their authority to allow adoption or reimbursement, expertise often lies with potential adop-
ters, giving them legitimacy in the struggle to control the diffusion of this technology. Materi-
al resources take the form of the capacity of actors to mobilize financial resources for the ac-
quisition of a PET scanner. For example, in Quebec, the Ministry of Health has the authority 
to allow the adoption of expensive technology, but also often provides acquisition and opera-
tional budgets. In Switzerland, authority is diluted between the cantonal and the federal gov-
ernments; while the former has material power to fund and to authorize acquisition, the latter 
has the authority to permit the reimbursement of the procedures which are paid by health care 
insurance. Hence, the governance structure determines who has access to material resources, 
authority and expertise thereby assigning roles, identities and responsibilities to institutional 
actors.  
The struggle for the control of the diffusion of the PET scanner is mediated by the 
struggle for the meaning of the technology. Struggles for meaning are attempts by actors to 
gain legitimacy by providing an interpretation for a material object which is aligned with their 
own values and interests, and which manifests itself in the interplay of theorizations and 
counter-theorizations. Theorizations are strategically mobilized arguments aimed at legitimiz-
ing the purpose of a technology, the adequacy of a potential adopter to acquire such a tech-
nology, and the appropriate way to disseminate it. In turn, institutional logics provide a reper-
toire of cultural-cognitive resources that may be mobilized in theorizations. 
35/47 
Given this backdrop, the case study suggests a number of ways in which the institu-
tional contexts influence the technology diffusion process. It is clear that institutional logics 
and governance structures interact and are mutually supportive in these cases. However, we 
separate them initially for analytical purposes in this discussion. 
Institutional Logics and Struggles for Meaning 
Because the PET scanner is a complex technology whose applications were not initial-
ly clear, this technology left room for professionals to provide meaning to the PET scanner in 
ways that suited their interests. In both jurisdictions, the initial institutional battles to legiti-
mate the technology and define its purposes occurred within a quality-based institutional log-
ic.  
Although a quality-based institutional logic was initially mobilized to legitimate the 
PET scanner and potential adopters, different institutional logics available in each institutional 
environment were used by actors to justify the way the PET scanner should subsequently be 
diffused. In each case, the legitimation strategy utilized was in the form of theorizations and 
was aligned with would-be adopter’s interests. In Quebec, it was assumed that grounding the 
purpose of the technology in scientific evidence would increase the likelihood of obtaining 
the PET scanner and orient the diffusion of the PET scanner according to the interest of cer-
tain actors. The publication of the Health Technology Assessment Agency’s report legiti-
mated it as a useful clinical tool that needed to be further developed by research. This theori-
zation was sanctioned by teaching hospitals who mobilized a quality-based institutional logic 
by underlining the importance of their competence to interpret PET scanner results, to disse-
minate this technology slowly, and to perform further research. However, the limited re-
sources available generated struggles for the meaning of the technology. The quality-based 
theorization was counter-theorized with an access-based institutional logic by the medical 
association and regional hospitals to ensure that smaller hospitals would obtain this technolo-
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gy. The theorization and counter-theorization between two factions tended to paralyze deci-
sion-making at least initially.   
In Switzerland, while the government developed an efficiency and quality based theo-
rization by contending that the reimbursement of PET scanner should be restricted to nomi-
nated centers for cost-containment and quality purposes and because it was still under evalua-
tion, the private clinic used a free-market counter-theorization by arguing that providers 
should be able to freely practice medicine and that all organizations wishing to offer this ser-
vice should be allowed to do so. Thus in each jurisdiction, institutional actors mobilized dif-
ferent institutional logics that best suited their values and interests, and through the interplay 
of theorization and counter-theorization they competed on institutionally established legiti-
mate grounds to capture resources. As we have mentioned previously, the health care sector is 
well-known for accommodating multiple institutional logics and this is clearly apparent in this 
study. 
However, because the governance structure of Quebec is a state-based model, there 
was no room for theorizations that built upon a market-based institutional logic, although the 
market-based institutional logic exists in other economic activity in Quebec. Mobilizing a 
market-based institutional logic is indeed absent from the rhetorical repertoire of institutional 
actors because market competition and profit are relative institutional taboos in this jurisdic-
tion. In contrast, market competition in health care is institutionalized in Switzerland and in-
stitutional actors do not hesitate to draw on this institutional logic to defend their interests, or 
to become institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988), basing their action on institutional 
logics to accommodate the institutional environment to their needs.  
We would add that contrary to Scott et al. (2000) who mingled efficiency-based and 
market-based institutional logics, this study suggests that these two logics are clearly distinct 
as suggested also by Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). While market logics insist on the impor-
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tance of freedom to compete according to instrumental interests, efficiency logics give prece-
dence to efficiency and economy, something that is not necessarily guaranteed by a market 
perspective. Given that this study compares the same type of economic activity (i.e. the health 
care sector), one interesting corollary is that identical economic sectors can carry different 
institutional logics affecting the content of the rhetorical field.  
In sum, while institutional logics structure the behavior of actors by providing them 
with cognitive templates to organize social life (Friedland and Alford, 1991), they also enable 
actors to instrumentally select institutional logics to influence the perception of actors accord-
ing to their own values and interest. Hence, the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Institutional logics structure the institutional field 
by restraining the rhetorical possibilities, but also enable actors 
to gain legitimacy or provide legitimacy to objects by instru-
mentally selecting the logic that best suits their values and in-
terests. 
Governance Structures and Struggles for Control 
As we noted in an earlier section, both jurisdictions share governance structures that to 
some extent pit organizations against one another in the competitive struggle to adopt new 
technology, and at the same time set bounds on this struggle through the use of regulatory 
bodies. However, there are some very important distinctions between the governance struc-
tures whose effects are evident in the patterns of diffusion described here.  
For example, the governance structure of the Swiss health care system is highly frag-
mented and has two main cleavages: 1) The co-existence of market and public regulative re-
gimes, and 2) the partial decentralization of the governance structure with responsibilities 
diluted between the cantonal and the federal governments, and the health care insurance com-
panies. This has the effect of diluting the power of governments by providing more freedom 
to other actors in their struggles for control and for meaning. 
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In Switzerland, since the public (state model) and the private (market model) struc-
tures are two complementary and legitimate regimes, institutional actors may position them-
selves under the regime which best suits their interests. Indeed, while the federal government 
denied the request of a private clinic to be added on the reimbursement list, the private clinic 
instrumentally mobilized the free-market institutional logic to threaten the government. Thus, 
the availability of two institutional logics corresponding to two different regulatory regimes 
offers opportunities for organizations to challenge the authority of the federal government in 
Switzerland.  
The public-private fragmentation of the Swiss health care system also allows organiza-
tions to bypass the regulation demanding that public organizations have authorization from 
the cantonal government before acquiring a PET scanner. Because private organizations are 
not subject to this law, some public hospitals found a strategy to acquire a PET scanner by 
subscribing to a private regime. For example, the presence of the private sphere helped teach-
ing hospitals THN and THS to acquire the technology in the face of denial or hesitation from 
government. Moreover, despite the fact that the teaching hospital THS was not initially on the 
federal reimbursement list, the decentralization of the governance structure allowed it to pass 
a contract with the cantonal health insurance body to have PET scanner procedures reim-
bursed.  
This contrasts with the Quebec health care system which is more centralized and cohe-
rent. Authorization to acquire technology as well as to obtain operating and acquisition budg-
ets is granted by a single central authority. Because the legitimate means to access financial 
resources are concentrated in one place, actors draw first on institutional logics to build theo-
rizations and counter-theorizations and to engage in legitimate discursive battles to convince 
authorities. Because there is no legitimate alternative mode of action in the case of govern-
ment opposition to the acquisition of the PET scanner, actors’ freedom is significantly lo-
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wered in the short run. Overall, it is clear that the relative fragmentation of the Swiss gover-
nance structure provided greater freedom to institutional actors to strategically mobilize laws, 
rules, and institutional logics that suited their particular interests: 
Proposition 2: The fragmentation of a governance structures 
provides regulative slack or freedom to institutional actors who 
may choose which regime to comply with, thereby seeking their 
own interest while still being legitimate in the eye of the law. 
When Institutional Logics Preempt Governance Structures 
Although the governance structures in both jurisdictions gave theoretical control to 
regulatory agencies over certain key decisions (e.g., the authorization of adoptions in Quebec 
and reimbursement rules in Switzerland), we observed in both cases that when regulatory bo-
dies found themselves in positions where their actions placed them in contradiction with do-
minant institutional logics embedded in the field, they were unable to sustain their positions. 
Episode Q4 illustrates this phenomenon for the Quebec case. At the point where the 
PET scanner had acquired strong quality-based legitimacy through the Health Technology 
Assessment Report, it was no longer possible for the government to sustain objections to de-
linquent adoptions without losing credibility and political capital. To maintain face, the gov-
ernment was obliged to generate a dissemination plan that largely satisfied potential adopters. 
The delinquent yet entrepreneurial behavior of adopters was rendered legitimate when norma-
tive and cultural-cognitive forces were stronger than regulative forces.  
Similarly, episode S2 illustrates a situation where the Swiss federal government was 
faced with a potential revolt concerning its reimbursement rules. While the private clinic PCS 
that legally contested these rules on the grounds of a market-based logic did not win its case, 
the Federal Department of Health was sufficiently worried about anti-trust issues that it mod-
ified its rules to open up diffusion, setting new rules that allowed the market-based logic to 
flourish within a quality-based framework.  
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Note that in both cases, entrepreneurial action that contravened current rules was re-
quired by health care providers to achieve adjustments in regulatory attitudes and require-
ments that fit dominant institutional logics. We label this type of entrepreneurial action “insti-
tution testing” and we formulate a final proposition: 
Proposition 3: Institution testing may result in change to regu-
latory constraints that speed up the diffusion of technology 
when the normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacies of the 
position defended are grounded in dominant institutional logics 
and have acquired sufficient force to trump regulatory legitima-
cy. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this discussion, we first consider the implications of the study for understanding the 
role of institutional contexts in the diffusion of bandwagon technology. We then broaden the 
perspective to look at its more general implications for the relationships among institutional 
governance structures, institutional logics and specific organizational decisions.  
Institutional Contexts and the Spread of Bandwagon Technology 
As might have been expected, the PET scanner diffused more rapidly in Switzerland 
than in Quebec. The competitive environment of the Swiss health care system in which pri-
vate and public health care institutions coexist and where there is relatively limited centralized 
decision making did enable hospitals to acquire the technology earlier. However, this broad 
global portrait hides diffusion process dynamics that have several similarities. Specifically, 
both cases were characterized by horizontal and vertical struggles that manifested themselves 
in attempts to define the technology in ways that favored particular actors and by strategic 
behaviors aimed at mobilizing material resources, authority and expertise to ensure desired 
outcomes. 
Struggles for meaning were embedded in the mix of institutional logics (Scott et al., 
2000) that underpinned the different health care systems. Thus, the most intensive struggles 
for meaning in the Quebec case involved competing theorizations about quality of care and 
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equity of access. In contrast, in the Swiss case, struggles for meaning developed around rights 
to compete in a free market and profitability as well as quality of care. Yet while multiple 
theorizations of the nature of the technology, its uses and the legitimacy of its acquirers were 
produced and exchanged, their impact was moderated by the power dynamics inherent in 
struggles for control, these in turn contingent on the structures of the respective health care 
systems.  
Interestingly, while governments in both jurisdictions tried to manage the diffusion 
process, intense bandwagon pressures undermined these attempts, though in different ways. 
For example, in Switzerland, public hospitals found innovative ways to bypass opposition 
from cantonal authorities by creating private initiatives and collaborations where different 
rules applied. In Quebec, government inertia prompted one teaching hospital to adopt the 
technology without official government consent. The forms of strategic behavior used by 
adopters can also be related to institutionalized value systems. In Quebec, the high legitimacy 
of quality of care considerations established by the health technology assessment report was 
sufficient to override regulatory constraints, rendering institutional testing possible. In Swit-
zerland, shared beliefs in the values of the free market contributed to legitimizing the beha-
viors. 
Overall, the study shows that institutional contexts do indeed influence the patterns of 
diffusion and adoption of technologies through their impact on decision structures and availa-
ble meanings. However, the underlying pressures for adoption associated with the bandwagon 
technology remain, giving rise to intense vertical and horizontal struggles whose form and 
outcomes may change but whose processual dynamics are remarkably similar.  
Governance Structures, Institutional Logics and the Testing of Institutions 
Beyond the pragmatic issue of the spread of technological innovations, the approach 
and findings of this study has some broader implications for institutional theory. Specifically, 
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the study shows how institutional structures and meanings may manifest themselves in the 
context of specific decisions within an organizational field. The particular decisions we con-
sidered required interactions and negotiations among multiple institutional agents embedded 
within the same institutional environment. The type of analysis we conducted here could be 
extended to multi-agent decisions in other institutional settings constituted around similar and 
different kinds of economic activity. Specifically, we argue that governance structures influ-
ence these processes by determining the patterns of material resources and authority available 
to actors in their struggles for control over decisions that concern them, while institutional 
logics constitute the discursive resources on which agents may legitimately and creatively 
draw to give meaning to their actions.  
In the study presented here, meaning-making through theorization was an important 
activity in part because the governance structures in place demanded it. Thus while meaning 
systems are indeed crucial in institutional analysis, we argue with Scott (2008) that attention 
also needs to be given to the structural arrangements surrounding and supporting them and to 
the multiple ways in which institutional logics and governance structures interact. As we saw, 
in the health care domain, certain governance structures within an organizational field may 
enable institutional pluralism (Kraatz and Block, 2008), generating struggles for meaning 
both within institutional logics and between them. The nature and outcomes of these strug-
gles, as well as the way in which they are resolved (through discourse or through the mobili-
zation of material resources) may provide hints as to the direction of future institutional shifts.    
This brings us to the possible implications of the study for institutional change. We fo-
cused mainly in this study on how institutional environments influenced the dynamics of 
technology diffusion rather than on how these processes might eventually influence institu-
tional environments. Yet the phenomenon of “institution testing” identified in both Quebec 
and Switzerland (see proposition 3) where entrepreneurial actors contested existing regulatory 
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constraints (through unilateral action in one case and legal challenge in the other) suggests 
that there are potential reciprocal influences.  
In these particular cases, the underlying normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacy of 
the institution-testing actions ultimately trumped regulatory legitimacy. Faced with a contest 
they felt they could not win, government actors quickly adjusted regulatory constraints to rea-
lign them with dominant institutional logics, preserving rather than fundamentally changing 
underlying belief systems and governance structures. Thus the process of institution testing 
and adjustment described here largely reproduced the institutional order. Nevertheless, over 
time, such contests could lead to more fundamental change. For example, the fragility of the 
government’s stance in blocking technology adoptions in the Quebec health care system is 
starkly revealed by this case study. One might hypothesize that in future cases, institution 
testing will be easier since there are precedents that have been tolerated and that make it more 
legitimate. It is possible that over time such testing will lead to more profound shifts not only 
in structures but in institutional logics.  
In the literature, entrepreneurial actions that contest institutions have generally been 
labeled “institutional entrepreneurship” (Hardy and Maguire, 2008; Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006)). We believe that this term is too strong in its connotations to reflect the kinds of insti-
tution testing on the margins that we observed. Although they were “entrepreneurs” in the 
sense of proactively pushing back regulatory boundaries, the people involved seemed moti-
vated more by the short-term instrumental goal of acquiring a technology, rather than by a 
determination to disrupt institutions. Nevertheless, through their strategic actions and their 
theorizations, they were – though perhaps unwittingly – doing a form of “institutional work” 
(Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) with potential to generate incremental institutional adjust-
ment. So, too, were the government actors who moved to preserve the integrity of their rule 
systems (and their own credibility) in the face of this testing.  
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We suggest that these episodes of institution testing and reaction at the margins consti-
tute one mechanism by which institutional frameworks may be stretched, reproduced and ul-
timately redefined in an organic and gradual manner as concrete problems and controversies 
succeed one another. Such a perspective helps contribute a much needed and much called for 
dynamic and recursive element to institutional analysis (Scott, 2008; Lawrence and Suddaby, 
2006). In other words, while the struggles for meaning and the struggles for control surround-
ing specific issues within an organizational field clearly reflect the institutional contexts in 
which they are embedded, they may also contribute to the recursive reproduction and adapta-
tion of those contexts, especially when the boundaries of legitimate struggle are tested.  
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